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The distinction between implicit and explicit forms of memory retrieval is long-standing,
and important to the extent it reveals how different neural architecture supports different
aspects of memory function. Similarly, distinctions have been made between kinds
of repetition priming, a form of implicit memory retrieval. This study focuses on the
production–identification (ID) priming distinction, which delineates priming tasks involving
verification of stimulus features as compared to priming tasks that require use of a cue
to guide response retrieval. Studies investigating this dissociation in dementia or similar
patient populations indicate that these forms of priming may differ in their neural bases.
The current study looks at degree of handedness as a way of investigating inferred
neural architecture supporting these two forms of priming. A growing body of research
indicates that degree of handedness (consistent, or CH, versus inconsistent, or ICH)
is associated with greater interhemispheric interaction and functional access to right
hemisphere processing in ICH, with superior performance seen in ICH on memory tasks
reliant on this processing. Arguments about the theoretical mechanisms underlying ID and
production forms of perceptual priming tasks suggest that performance on these tasks
will differ as a function of degree of handedness. We tested this question in a group of
CH and ICH young adults, who were asked to study lists of words prior to performing a
production priming task (word stem completion, WSC), a perceptual word ID task, and
a word stem cued recall task. While both handedness groups exhibited reliable priming
across tasks, WSC priming was greater in ICH than CH participants, with ID priming not
differing between groups. This dissociation supports the argument that production and ID
forms of priming have different underlying neural bases.
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INTRODUCTION
The fact that memory expresses itself in diverse ways is well
established. For example, memory can be expressed explicitly
or implicitly. Explicit memory has been described as memory
that includes conscious, deliberate retrieval of past experiences
or information, and implicit memory has been described as
an unintentional form of retrieval occurring without awareness.
Explicit memory is measured through the use of recall or recog-
nition tests, in which individuals are asked to deliberately retrieve
information from a target experience or study episode. Implicit
memory, on the other hand, is typically measured through rep-
etition priming, where the contents of memory are revealed
through facilitated performance (greater accuracy, faster respond-
ing) on tasks using previously encountered materials relative
to new materials, without deliberate conscious recollection of
a target episode or event. Dissociations between explicit and
implicit memory performance are often observed, especially in
amnesia (e.g., Shimamura, 1986) and aging (e.g., LaVoie and
Light, 1994), where amnesics and older adults often demonstrate
impaired performance on explicit memory tasks relative to nor-
mal controls and young adults, respectively, yet relatively spared
performance on repetition priming tasks. Such dissociations are
used to support the argument that different memory systems or
underlying neural architecture support these different forms of
memory.
Just as there are observed dissociations between tasks used to
measure implicit and explicit memory, dissociations also have
been observed between different categories of tasks typically
used to measure repetition priming. One observed dissociation
is between perceptual and conceptual forms of priming (Roediger
and McDermott, 1993). Perceptual priming reflects memory for
stimulus form, and is hypothesized to engage perceptual process-
ing mechanisms. As a result, this form of priming is sensitive to
perceptual characteristics of stimuli across study-test conditions
(e.g., there is reduced priming when the stimulus study and test
modality differ). Examples of perceptual priming tasks include
word identification (ID), picture or word naming, word stem
and word fragment completion. Conceptual priming refers to
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memory for stimulus meaning, and is sensitive to manipulations
that enhance semantic processing, e.g., conceptual elaboration of
study words, but is rather impervious to perceptual characteristics
of stimuli.
Another dissociation, and the focus of this study, is that
between production versus ID priming (Gabrieli et al., 1994).
ID priming tasks are typically those in which an individual must
identify, classify, or verify an attribute of a stimulus from a guiding
cue, with the response limited by the cue to a single item. For
example, in word ID tasks individuals must identify a briefly
flashed word. Priming is exhibited when previously studied words
are more readily identified (i.e., more quickly or with greater
accuracy) than new words. In this case, the guiding cue is the word
itself. Production priming tasks are those in which an individual
uses a cue to produce a response, but that response is not limited
to a single specific item. Rather, a target item must be selected
from amongst an array of plausible alternatives. For example, in
word stem completion (WSC) tasks, individuals must add letters
to the first three letters of a word cue to form a longer word.
Priming is exhibited when the added letters form a previously
studied word versus an alternative completion.
Dissociations between ID and production based priming tasks
are hypothesized to be due to the differing demands on attentional
resources that each of these tasks makes. Relative to ID tasks,
production tasks involve high levels of response competition due
to the cueing of more than one alternative, with resolution of
this competition necessary to produce a response. Gabrieli et al.
(1999) argue that attentional resources are essential at encoding
for the target item to be produced instead of an alternative. In
support of their argument, they report reduced priming on pro-
duction tasks relative to ID tasks in individuals with Alzheimer’s
disease, a disease in which attention deficits manifest early in its
course, as well as in young adults experiencing divided attention
during study. Others have reported similar production–ID disso-
ciations (e.g., Fleischman et al., 2001; LaVoie and Faulkner, 2008),
although dissociations are not always observed, even when stimuli
are chosen so that response competition is directly manipulated,
and demands on attention theoretically increased (e.g., Geraci
and Hamilton, 2009; Prull, 2010). Nonetheless, a recent meta-
analysis examining the relationship between divided attention
and implicit memory performance across 21 studies supports the
production–ID priming distinction, with divided attention effects
being larger for production tasks than ID tasks (Spataro et al.,
2011).
The reported role of attention in production based prim-
ing tasks is particularly important to the study described here,
as arguments have been made (e.g., Banich and Belger, 1990)
that as task complexity (and consequent demands on atten-
tional resources) increases, interhemispheric interaction becomes
important for task performance. Specifically, interhemispheric
interaction is argued to be a general strategy employed by the
brain to increase attentional resources when task demands are
high (Passarotti et al., 2002). Support for this argument rests
largely in the use of the Banich paradigm, in which participants
are asked to gaze at a fixation point on a screen, with a target
letter displayed at the bottom, to either the left or right side of
the fixation point. Probe items are displayed at the top of the
screen, also to the left and right of the fixation point. On all trials,
participants are to decide if the target and probe items match. In
within-hemisphere conditions, the probe and target letters appear
on the same side of the screen, in their respective rows (e.g., both
left of the fixation point). Matching decisions on these trials is
assumed to occur without interhemispheric interaction as both
the target and probe are encoded within the same hemisphere. In
across-hemisphere conditions, target, and probe items appear on
opposite sides of the fixation point in their respective rows (e.g.,
the target is left of the fixation point, but the probe is right of
the fixation point). Match decisions on these trials require inter-
hemispheric interaction as the probe and target items are encoded
in different hemispheres. Critically, as task demands increase,
performance improves on across-hemisphere trials, but does not
on within-hemisphere trials (see Banich, 1998, for a review).
This across-hemisphere advantage is argued to occur because
processing resources are recruited from both hemispheres to meet
difficult task demands, while such recruitment and coordination
of processing across hemispheres on easier tasks produces a cost
that negatively impacts performance on the easier trials. Inter-
hemispheric interaction appears to be an important factor, then,
in the performance of complex, attentionally demanding cogni-
tive tasks, but is less important for the performance of simpler,
less attentionally demanding cognitive tasks. This conclusion is
particularly important to the study described here, as a growing
body of research is pointing to a similarly important role of
interhemispheric interaction in memory function.
The important role of interhemispheric interaction in mem-
ory function has come in recent years from the examination of
degree of handedness differences in memory task performance.
This research typically compares the performance of mixed (or
inconsistent) handedness (ICH) to strong (or consistent) hand-
edness (CH), hypothesizing that the larger corpus callosum size
seen in ICH relative to CH individuals (Luders et al., 2010)
produces decreased interhemispheric communication and poorer
integration of information across hemispheres in CH individ-
uals on tasks in which such interhemispheric communication
is needed. As such, degree of handedness has been argued to
be a marker for functional differences in memory performance
on tasks hypothesized to be dependent upon interhemispheric
interaction (Lyle et al., 2008), with ICH individuals hypothesized
to perform better than CH individuals on such tasks. Indeed,
across a variety of paradigms, ICH is associated with better per-
formance on memory tasks, including superior source memory
(Lyle et al., 2008), greater resistance to false recall (Christman
et al., 2004), as well as greater incidental memory for deeply
processed words (Christman and Butler, 2011). The majority of
tasks testing this argument have been episodic memory tasks, but
the finding that production priming tasks are sensitive to divided
attention manipulations suggests that as a category of tasks, they
too may be sensitive to degree of handedness, especially given the
important role of interhemispheric interaction in attentionally
demanding tasks. To the extent that production priming tasks are
more demanding of attention than are ID tasks, and to the extent
that interhemispheric interaction is necessary for performance of
attentionally demanding tasks, then there should be differences
between CH and ICH individuals on production priming tasks,
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but not ID priming tasks. While Propper et al. (2005) reported no
handedness differences in fragment completion priming, a type
of production priming task, it is difficult to make generalizations
about priming performance and degree of handedness from this
single study, especially when no other type of priming task was
included. The purpose of the study described here, then, was to
specifically examine production and ID priming performance in
CH and ICH individuals, as we hypothesize that degree of hand-
edness should reveal production–ID priming dissociations, given
the demands production tasks make on attention and interhemi-
spheric interaction. We expected CH individuals as compared to
ICH individuals to demonstrate reduced priming on a WSC task,
but equivalent priming between degree of handedness groups on
a word ID task, a task not hypothesized to be as attentionally




Thirty-nine individuals (mean age 19.31 years, SD = 1.10),
recruited from undergraduate psychology courses at Saint Louis
University, participated. All received partial course credit for
their participation. Twenty-four (61.5%) of the participants were
male. Handedness was measured via the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) where scores can range from
−100 (exclusive left-handed) to +100 (exclusive right-handed),
with a score ≥±80 used to distinguish consistent from incon-
sistent handedness (Prichard et al., 2013). Using these criteria
for classification, and EHI scores in our total sample ranging
from 30 to 100, 22 (56.4%) participants were categorized as
consistent handed (CH; scores 80–100), and 17 participants were
categorized as inconsistent handed (ICH; scores 30–75), to form
two degree of handedness groups. Both groups scored similarly on
tests of forward (MCH = 6, MICH = 7) and backward (MCH = 5,
MICH = 5) digit span, as well as on the Nelson–Denny Vocabulary
test (MCH = 13/25, MICH = 14/25).
STIMULI
Study stimuli consisted of 238 nouns, one to three syllables
in length, selected from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database
(Wilson, 1988). The average Kucera and Francis (1967) frequency
rating of these words was 39 per million. Two hundred items were
randomly chosen to appear as either study items (100 items) or
filler items (100 items) in the study-test sessions, with their role
as either study or filler item counterbalanced across conditions
so that all words appeared in each of these roles across partic-
ipants. An additional 100 items chosen using the same criteria
were used as items for a perceptual threshold baseline task, and
never appeared as study or filler items in the primary study-test
tasks. E-Prime was used for the presentation of all stimuli in the
computer-based tasks.
PROCEDURE
The basic procedures of this experiment replicated those of LaVoie
and Faulkner (2008). After being presented with the recruit-
ment statement and answering any questions, participants were
informed that they would be presented with a series of computer-
based and paper-and-pencil tasks. Each participant was tested
individually.
The initial task for all participants was the perceptual threshold
baseline task, used to determine individual word ID thresholds.
Using a staircase procedure, participants were asked to identify
individual words presented on the computer screen at rates vary-
ing from 13 to 130 ms. Each presentation increased or decreased
in 13 ms steps (depending on whether the current staircase was
ascending or descending) in order to determine the presentation
rate at which each participant could correctly identify approxi-
mately 50% of the items. Each trial began with an on-screen focal
cue (++++++) lasting for 500 ms followed by a 100 ms blank
screen and then a word (which stayed on screen for 13–130 ms).
Each word was followed by a pattern mask (@@@@@@) lasting
for 60 ms, followed by a string of question marks as a prompt
for the participant to verbally identify the briefly presented word.
Participants were encouraged to guess if they were uncertain. Ten
staircase trials were included in this task in order to determine
the display rate threshold for each individual participant, which
was then utilized in the later word ID task. The mean display rate
determined for each group using this procedure was identical at
26 ms (the range across individuals was 13–39 ms).
Two study-test sessions followed the perceptual threshold
task. Each session started with the presentation of a study list,
followed by a 10-min delay in which participants completed
math problems to prevent study item rehearsal, a repetition
priming task (either WSC or word ID; the order of which
was counterbalanced across conditions), then a cued recall test.
For the study lists, items were individually presented on-screen
for 2000 ms with a 500 ms blank screen between items. In
order to ensure proper encoding, participants were asked to
recite each word aloud as it was presented. Participants then
completed math problems for 10 min prior to performing the
priming task, either the WSC task or word ID task. The paper-
and-pencil WSC task consisted of 50 three-letter word stems
(25 studied items, 25 unstudied fillers, randomly ordered). All
stems could be completed to form more than one alternative.
Participants were asked to add one or more letters in order to
form the first word that came to mind, with no time constraint
to complete the task (participants generally completed the task in
under 5 min). For the computer-based ID task participants were
presented a different set of 25 studied items and 25 unstudied
fillers in random order, with each item presented at the display
rate determined by the perceptual threshold baseline task at the
start of the experiment. Participants were encouraged to verbally
guess the word if they were unable to confidently identify it. The
experimenter noted each response and initiated each individual
trial.
The second study-test session immediately followed the first
study-test session. Identical procedures were used with the only
difference being the use of the priming task that was not included
in the first session (to ensure counterbalancing). After completion
of both study-test sessions, participants received a cued recall test
consisting of 100 items (50 studied items not used on either of
the priming tasks, 50 unstudied fillers). The first three letters of
each item were given as cues and participants were instructed to
specifically think back to items they had studied earlier in the
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experiment to complete the stems. Finally, participants received
digit span measures (forward and backward), the EHI, a demo-
graphics questionnaire, and the Nelson–Denny vocabulary test.
At the conclusion of all testing, participants were asked whether
during performance of the priming tasks (i.e., the WSC and word
ID tasks) they noticed that some of the words had been pre-
sented earlier (i.e., during the encoding/study phase). For those
participants that responded affirmatively (N = 3), a follow up
question was posed asking if they intentionally used those words
to complete the stems during that priming task. No participant
responded affirmatively to this question.
RESULTS
All test score data (WSC, ID, and stem cued recall) were analyzed
in separate independent group t-tests comparing CH to ICH
participants. For the repetition priming tasks, the scores used
for analysis consisted of priming scores: (1) for the WSC task,
priming scores were calculated as studied items completed as
targets minus filler items completed as targets; (2) for the ID
task, priming scores were calculated as studied items correctly
identified minus filler items correctly identified. For the stem
cued recall task, the scores used for analysis were the proportion
of studied word stems correctly completed as studied items.
Mean proportion correct and priming scores for each task and
group are displayed in Table 1. As predicted, WSC (production)
priming was reliably greater in the ICH group than the CH group,
t(37) = 2.156, p = 0.038 (effect size Cohen’s d = 0.697), while
word ID priming did not differ between groups, t(37) < 1.0. We
note that the magnitude of ID priming is relatively low in both
groups [although in both groups the magnitude of priming is
greater than 0, CH t(21) = 3.59, p = 0.002, ICH t(17) = 3.92,
p = 0.001] with baseline ID rates being unexpectedly well above
50%, and indeed at ceiling levels of performance. If we remove
from analysis those individuals who identified 100% of the ID
filler items (10 CH individuals, six ICH individuals), a different
pattern emerges, with CH (n = 12) individuals demonstrat-
ing greater ID priming (mean priming = 0.09, reliably greater
than 0, p = 0.000) than ICH (n = 11) individuals (mean prim-
ing = 0.05, reliably greater than 0, p = 0.000), t(21) = 2.04,
p = 0.054. (It should be noted that the between group difference
on WSC priming performance remains, although is somewhat
reduced; mean WSC priming CH = 0.10, mean WSC priming
ICH = 0.15, p = 0.051). WS cued recall also did not differ
between groups, t < 1.0 for both the full and reduced sample
analyses.
Table 1 | Mean proportion correct and mean priming effects for each
task by handedness (SD’s in parentheses).
Task CH ICH
WSC Studied target 0.32 (0.10) 0.42 (0.11)
Filler 0.24 (0.08) 0.27 (0.08)
Difference (priming) 0.08 (0.10) 0.15 (0.10)
ID Studied target 0.99 (0.02) 0.99 (0.05)
Filler 0.94 (0.07) 0.95 (0.03)
Difference (priming) 0.05 (0.06) 0.04 (0.04)
Cued recall 0.37 (0.07) 0.39 (0.09)
DISCUSSION
As a reminder, the primary purpose of this study was to examine
potential production–ID priming task dissociations between CH
and ICH individuals. Our findings indicate such dissociation
exists. In our complete full sample analyses, these groups show
a single dissociation, with greater production priming shown in
ICH relative to CH individuals, as we predicted, but equivalent
levels of ID priming. In our smaller sample analyses, a double
dissociation emerges, with ICH individuals continuing to demon-
strate larger production priming effects than CH individuals,
but CH individuals showing larger ID priming effects than ICH
individuals. While preliminary, the overall pattern of findings
we report extend both our understanding of production and ID
priming, as well as our understanding of the role of degree of
handedness in memory.
The extant findings showing systematic variations in explicit
memory performance as a result of degree of handedness point
to the role of interhemispheric communication as an important
factor supporting memory function. To the extent that memory
task performance is reliant on integration and comparison of
hemisphere-specific information, then performance will be better
when such integration occurs (Propper et al., 2005). Our findings
suggest that this integration is important for production priming
as well, and is consistent with reports in the literature examining
the role of hemisphere-specific information on priming perfor-
mance in patients with complete callosotomies (e.g., Cronin-
Golomb et al., 1996; Kroll et al., 2003). In these studies, WSC
priming appears dependent upon access to right hemisphere
(RH) information, especially when multiple alternatives exist to
form a completion. Cronin-Golomb et al. (1996) argue that the
information transferred across hemispheres is necessary for the
elicitation of an appropriate response from an array of limited,
possible responses, and that without such information transfer,
WSC priming is impaired. This information transfer may be
necessary for attentionally demanding tasks only, as priming that
involves single solutions (as may be the case in ID priming
tasks where cues direct individuals to a single response) appears
to be less reliant on integration of information across the two
hemispheres. Our findings are generally consistent with these
claims from patient studies, and further support distinctions in
production–ID priming. Future research specifically comparing
single versus multiple solution production task performance as a
function of degree of handedness would be helpful in elucidating
this argument.
Unexpectedly, stem cued recall did not differ between groups.
The simple explanation for this finding is that we lacked the power
to detect such a difference given our sample size, but we’d like to
speculate on some potential alternative theoretical explanations.
First, while degree of handedness generally produces group dif-
ferences in recall performance, it is not always found on tasks like
ours. Christman and Butler (2011), for example, employed a levels
of processing manipulation in an incidental learning paradigm,
and found that recall of words processed at shallow levels did not
differ between CH and ICH individuals. The generally low levels
of processing performed on study items in our task may be a factor
in explaining why we did not observe group differences in cued
recall. Both ours and the Christman and Butler (2011) findings
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suggest that degree of handedness effects in memory function
may only be present when information is processed or encoded
at a meaningful level, but more research is needed specifically
examining this hypothesis before generalizations can be made.
As a second alternative explanation, consider work conducted by
Marsolek et al. (1992), in which they investigated the hypothesis
that there are distinct word form brain systems involved in the
performance of priming tasks (defined as WSC tasks in their
set of experiments) and cued recall (defined as WS cued recall).
They find evidence that the RH controls a word form system
that is responsible for storage of form-specific representations
of words that support priming on WSC tasks, affording a RH
advantage in WSC priming. Both hemispheres, though, maintain
abstract word forms that support recognition and WS cued recall,
and so the RH advantage observed on WSC priming tasks is no
longer observed. These findings suggest that degree of handedness
differences may not be present when WS cued recall tasks are
employed, as performance on such tasks is not RH dependent,
but can be supported by left hemisphere processing. Our find-
ings support such an argument, but remain purely speculative.
Nonetheless, it does suggest further exploration in future studies
to better delineate the conditions and factors by which degree of
handedness impacts memory.
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